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 Summary/Résumé/Resumen 
 
Summary 
 
The 1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis on 
corporate responsibility. These emerged in the aftermath of a period that saw a major shift in 
the economic role of the state, and in policies toward transnational corporations (TNCs) and 
foreign direct investment. Whereas in the 1970s many national governments had sought to 
regulate the activities of TNCs, the 1980s was a decade of deregulation and increased efforts to 
attract foreign investment. A similar trend occurred at the international level, where efforts at 
regulation had been unsuccessful.  
 
It is in this context that the recent wave of voluntary codes of conduct must be situated. US 
companies began introducing such codes in the early 1990s, and the practice spread to Europe 
in the mid-1990s. Voluntary codes of conduct range from vague declarations of business 
principles applicable to international operations, to more substantive efforts at self-regulation. 
They tend to focus on the impact of TNCs in two main areas: social conditions and the 
environment. A variety of stakeholders, including international trade union organizations, 
development and environmental NGOs and the corporate sector itself have played a role in the 
elaboration of codes of conduct for international business. 
 
Several changes in the global economy have contributed to the growing interest in corporate 
social responsibility and codes of conduct. The growth of global value chains, through which 
Northern buyers control a web of suppliers in the South, has led to calls for the latter to take 
responsibility not only for aspects such as quality and delivery dates, but also for working 
conditions and environmental impacts. At the same time, the increased significance of brands 
and corporate reputation makes leading companies particularly vulnerable to bad publicity. 
Changing public attitudes are also an important part of the context in which corporate codes of 
conduct have been adopted. Companies in the North can no longer ignore the impact of their 
activities on the environment with impunity. Developments in global communications, which 
have enabled corporations to control production activities on an ever-widening scale, have also 
facilitated the international transmission of information about working conditions in their 
overseas suppliers, increasing public awareness and facilitating campaigning activities. 
 
A range of stakeholders are involved in drawing up voluntary codes of conduct, or can be 
affected by their adoption. These include large and small firms, Northern and Southern NGOs, 
trade unions, shareholders and investors, consumers, consultancy firms and verifiers, Southern 
exporters, workers in the South, Southern governments, and local communities. All have 
specific interests that predispose them more or less favourably toward corporate codes, and 
influence the kinds of codes that they would like to see implemented. 
 
One of the striking characteristics of the recent growth of codes of conduct is their tendency to 
be concentrated in certain sectors, particularly trade, textiles, chemicals and extractive 
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 industries. Codes addressing labour issues tend to be concentrated in sectors such as garments, 
footwear, sports goods, toys and retailing, whereas environmental codes are more likely to be 
found in chemicals, forestry, oil and mining. 
 
Codes of conduct can be divided into five main types: company codes, trade association codes, 
multi-stakeholder codes, model codes and inter-governmental codes. Codes vary considerably 
in scope. Many do not even cover all of the International Labour Organizations core labour 
standards. Company codes and trade association codes often have a more limited scope than 
those developed in conjunction with other stakeholders. There are also differences in the 
coverage of codes. Although many do cover the firms suppliers, they often do not extend all 
the way along the supply chain, and very rarely cover home-based workers. Provisions for the 
implementation of a particular code, and for effective monitoring, are crucial if it is to have any 
real impact. Here, too, one finds weaknesses, with only a small proportion of codes making 
provision for independent monitoring. 
 
In evaluating corporate codes of conduct, several limitations need to be pointed out. Some of 
these are practical, arising from the way codes have (or have not) been implemented up to now. 
Others are inherent to corporate codes as an instrument, and therefore go beyond constraints 
related to the way codes have been applied in the past. Despite the recent proliferation of codes, 
their implementation remains relatively limited. Other shortcomings relate to the limited 
number of issues they address, and who such codes apply to. More deep-seated structural 
limitations of codes of conduct relate to the drivers that gave rise to their proliferation during 
the 1990s. Not only are they limited to particular sectors, where brand names and corporate 
image are important, but they are also mainly applied to firms engaged in exporting. Finally, 
there is a tendency for codes to focus on particular issuesthose regarded as potentially highly 
damaging for companies to be associated with. In other words, issues that have a high profile in 
developed countries are likely to figure prominently in most codes. 
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of codes, they can and have generated positive benefits for 
stakeholders. Examples where working conditions have improved show that codes can provide 
leverage on corporate behaviour. Furthermore, because of codes of conduct, firms increasingly 
accept responsibility for the activities of their suppliers as well as their own subsidiaries. 
 
There is a danger, however, of codes being seen as something more than they really are, and used 
to deflect criticism and reduce the demand for external regulation. In some cases, codes have led 
to a worsening of the situation of those whom they purport to benefit. Concern has also been 
expressed that they may tend to undermine the position of trade unions in the workplace. 
 
The limitations and dangers of codes of conduct identified in this paper are undoubtedly real. It 
is thus important to develop strategies to ensure that codes are complementary to government 
legislation and provide space for workers to organize. They are most likely to do so when they 
are multi-stakeholder codes, rather than when they are unilaterally developed by companies or 
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 trade associations. Codes of conduct should be seen as an area of political contestation, not as a 
solution to the problems created by the globalization of economic activity. 
 
Rhys Jenkins is a Reader of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia, United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
Résumé 
Les années 90 ont été marquées par la prolifération des codes de conduite et par une volonté 
plus forte de responsabiliser les entreprises. On sortait alors dune période pendant laquelle le 
rôle économique de lEtat sétait profondément modifié, tout comme les politiques à légard des 
sociétés transnationales (STN) et des investissements étrangers directs. Tandis que de nombreux 
gouvernements nationaux sétaient attachés pendant les années 70 à réglementer les activités 
des STN, les années 80 ont été celles de la libéralisation où lon sest efforcé dattirer les 
investissements étrangers. On a observé la même tendance au niveau international où les efforts 
en faveur de la libéralisation se sont avérés loin dêtre satisfaisants.  
 
Cest dans ce contexte quil faut replacer la vague récente des codes de conduite volontaires. 
Des sociétés américaines ont commencé à introduire ces codes au début des années 90 et la 
pratique a gagné lEurope vers 1995. Les codes de conduite volontaires recouvrent des réalités 
très diverses, allant de vagues déclarations de principes applicables aux opérations 
internationales à des efforts réels dautorégulation. Ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur les effets 
des activités des STN dans deux grands domaines: les conditions sociales et lenvironnement. 
Diverses parties prenantes, dont des organisations syndicales internationales, des ONG 
travaillant dans le domaine du développement et de lenvironnement et les entreprises elles-
mêmes, ont contribué à lélaboration de codes de conduite pour les sociétés internationales.  
 
Plusieurs changements dans léconomie mondiale ont contribué à éveiller lintérêt pour les 
codes de conduite et pour une responsabilisation sociale des entreprises. Avec le 
développement des chaînes mondiales des valeurs, dans lesquelles des acheteurs du Nord 
contrôlent un réseau de fournisseurs implantés au Sud, ces derniers ont été appelés à répondre 
non seulement daspects comme la qualité et les dates de livraison, mais aussi des conditions de 
travail et des effets sur lenvironnement. En même temps, limportance accrue des marques et 
de la réputation des entreprises rend les grandes sociétés particulièrement vulnérables à une 
mauvaise publicité. Lévolution des comportements du public est aussi un facteur de poids 
parmi ceux qui ont amené les entreprises à adopter des codes de conduite. Les sociétés du Nord 
ne peuvent plus impunément ignorer les effets de leurs activités sur lenvironnement. 
Lévolution des communications mondiales, qui a permis à des sociétés dexercer un contrôle 
plus important sur leurs activités de production, a aussi favorisé la diffusion au niveau 
international dinformations sur les conditions de travail chez leurs fournisseurs à létranger, 
augmentant la sensibilité du public et facilitant les campagnes.  
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Participent à lélaboration des codes de conduite volontaires ou peuvent être touchés par leur 
adoption des entreprises, grandes et petites, des ONG du Nord et du Sud, des syndicats, des 
actionnaires et des investisseurs, des consommateurs, des cabinets de consultants et daudit, des 
exportateurs du Sud, des travailleurs du Sud, des gouvernements du Sud et des collectivités 
locales. Ces diverses parties ont des intérêts spécifiques qui font quelles sont plus ou moins 
favorablement disposées envers les codes dentreprises et quelles souhaitent voir appliquer tel 
ou tel type de code. 
 
Ce qui frappe lorsquon étudie la multiplication récente des codes de conduite, cest quils se 
concentrent généralement dans certains secteurs déterminés, notamment le commerce, 
lindustrie textile, les produits chimiques et les industries extractives. Les codes relatifs aux 
questions du travail portent surtout sur des secteurs tels que lhabillement, la chaussure, les 
articles de sport, les jouets et le commerce de détail, tandis que les codes environnementaux 
vont plutôt réglementer lindustrie chimique, pétrolière et minière et la sylviculture.  
 
On distingue cinq catégories principales de code de conduite: les codes de sociétés, les codes 
dassociations commerciales, les codes élaborés par des groupes dintérêt multiples, les codes 
modèles et les codes intergouvernementaux. Leur portée peut varier considérablement. 
Beaucoup ne reprennent même pas toutes les normes essentielles du travail édictées par 
lOrganisation internationale du travail. Les codes de sociétés et dassociations commerciales 
ont une portée plus limitée que ceux qui sont élaborés avec le concours dautres parties. Les 
sujets traités varient aussi. Bien que beaucoup comportent des dispositions visant les 
fournisseurs de la société, ils ne vont généralement pas jusquà couvrir toute la chaîne de 
lapprovisionnement et ne sintéressent que très rarement aux travailleurs à domicile. Les 
dispositions relatives à lapplication du code en vue dun contrôle effectif sont cruciales si lon 
veut quil ait un impact réel. Les codes pèchent aussi par là: seul un faible pourcentage dentre 
eux prévoit un contrôle indépendant.  
 
En évaluant les codes de conduite, lon peut remarquer et signaler leurs limites. Certaines 
dentre elles sont pratiques et tiennent à la façon dont ils ont été appliqués jusquà présent. 
Dautres sont inhérentes aux codes comme instrument et vont donc au-delà de la façon dont ils 
ont été appliqués dans le passé. Bien quils prolifèrent depuis peu, leur application reste assez 
limitée. Ils pèchent aussi par le nombre restreint des questions abordées et des entités 
auxquelles ils sappliquent. Leurs faiblesses structurelles plus profondes tiennent aux mobiles 
qui expliquent leur prolifération dans les années 90. Ils se limitent non seulement à des secteurs 
concrets où les marques et limage de lentreprise ont leur importance mais encore le plus 
souvent aux sociétés dexportation. Enfin, ils ont tendance à porter sur des questions 
particulièrescelles qui peuvent se révéler extrêmement dommageables pour une société si son 
nom y est associé. Autrement dit, les questions auxquelles les pays développés sont très 
sensibles ont des chances de tenir une place de choix dans la plupart des codes.  
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 Malgré toutes leurs faiblesses, les codes peuvent avoir et ont eu des avantages pour les parties 
prenantes. Les exemples dans lesquels les conditions de travail se sont améliorées montrent que 
les codes permettent dinfluer sur le comportement de lentreprise. De plus, à cause des codes 
de conduite, les sociétés répondent de plus en plus des activités non seulement de leurs filiales 
mais aussi de leurs fournisseurs.  
 
Il existe un danger, pourtant, celui de voir dans le code plus que ce quil nest vraiment et de 
sen servir pour désamorcer les critiques et réduire la demande de régulation extérieure. Dans 
certains cas, les codes ont entraîné une dégradation de la situation de ceux qui étaient censés en 
bénéficier. Certains craignent aussi quils ne sapent la position des syndicats sur le lieu de 
travail.  
 
Les limites et les dangers des codes de conduite relevés dans ce document sont à nen pas 
douter bien réels. Il est donc important délaborer des stratégies pour veiller à ce quils 
complètent la législation du gouvernement et laissent aux travailleurs la liberté de sorganiser. 
Les codes de conduite ont plus de chances de remplir ces conditions lorsque diverses parties ont 
concouru à leur élaboration que lorsquils résultent du travail unilatéral de sociétés ou 
dassociations professionnelles. Ils devraient apparaître comme un lieu de contestation politique 
et non pas comme la solution des problèmes posés par la mondialisation de léconomie.  
 
Rhys Jenkins est professeur détudes du développement à lUniversité dEast-Anglia (Royaume-
Uni). 
 
 
 
Resumen 
En el decenio de 1990 proliferaron los códigos de conducta y hubo mayor insistencia en la 
responsabilidad empresarial. Dichos códigos surgieron tras un periodo en que el papel 
económico del Estado y las políticas experimentaron un cambio de orientación hacia las 
empresas transnacionales y las inversiones extranjeras directas. Si bien en el decenio de 1970, 
muchos gobiernos nacionales habían procurado regular las actividades de las empresas 
transnacionales, los años 80 se caracterizaron por la liberalización y los esfuerzos redoblados 
para atraer la inversión extranjera. Hubo una tendencia similar a escala internacional, donde la 
labor desplegada en pro de la liberalización no fue satisfactoria.  
 
La oleada reciente de códigos de conducta voluntarios debe situarse en este contexto. Las 
empresas americanas comenzaron a introducir dichos códigos a principios de los años 90, y su 
práctica se extendió en Europa a mediados de este decenio. Los códigos voluntarios de 
conducta abarcan desde las declaraciones vagas de principios comerciales aplicables a 
operaciones internacionales, hasta esfuerzos más sustanciales para la autorreglamentación. 
Tienden a centrarse en las consecuencias de las empresas transnacionales en dos esferas 
principales: las condiciones sociales y el medio ambiente. Varios participantes, inclusive 
organizaciones sindicales internacionales, organizaciones no gubernamentales para el 
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 desarrollo y el medio ambiente, y el sector empresarial propiamente dicho, han contribuido a 
elaborar códigos de conducta para las empresas internacionales.  
 
Algunos cambios producidos en la economía mundial han fomentado el interés creciente de las 
empresas por la responsabilidad social y los códigos de conducta. El crecimiento de las 
cadenas mundiales de valor, a través de las cuales los compradores del Norte controlan una 
red de proveedores del Sur, ha dado lugar a que se invitara a las empresas a asumir 
responsabilidades no solamente con respecto a la calidad y las fechas de envío, por ejemplo, 
sino también a las condiciones de trabajo y las consecuencias ambientales. Al mismo tiempo, la 
mayor importancia adquirida por las marcas y la reputación de las empresas líderes conduce a 
que estas últimas sean particularmente vulnerables a la crítica. Las actitudes del público en 
constante evolución también son una parte importante del contexto en que se han adoptado los 
códigos empresariales de conducta. Las empresas del Norte ya no pueden ignorar las 
consecuencias de sus actividades en el medio ambiente con impunidad. La evolución de las 
comunicaciones mundiales, que ha permitido a las empresas controlar sus actividades de 
producción a una escala cada vez mayor, también ha facilitado la transmisión internacional de 
información sobre las condiciones de trabajo de sus proveedores en el extranjero, aumentando 
la conciencia pública y facilitando actividades de acción. 
 
Una serie de partes interesadas participan en la elaboración de códigos voluntarios de conducta, 
o pueden verse afectadas por su adopción. Estas partes incluyen pequeñas y grandes empresas, 
organizaciones no gubernamentales del Norte y del Sur, sindicatos, accionistas e inversores, 
consumidores, asesorías y verificadores, exportadores del Sur, trabajadores del Sur, gobiernos 
del Sur y comunidades locales. Todos ellos tienen intereses específicos que les predisponen a 
favor de los códigos empresariales, e influencian los tipos de códigos cuya aplicación desearían. 
 
Una de las características sorprendentes del crecimiento actual de los códigos de conducta es su 
tendencia a concentrarse en determinados sectores, en particular el comercio, la industria textil, 
de productos químicos y extractiva. Los códigos que abarcan las cuestiones laborales tienden a 
concentrarse en sectores como el del vestido, calzado, material de deporte, muñecos y la venta 
al pormenor, mientras que los códigos ambientales suelen ser más frecuentes en el ámbito de los 
productos químicos, la silvicultura, el petróleo y la minería. 
 
Los códigos de conducta se dividen en cinco categorías principales: códigos de empresas, 
códigos de asociaciones comerciales, códigos elaborados por múltiples grupos de interés, 
códigos modelo, y códigos intergubernamentales. El alcance de los códigos varía 
considerablemente. Muchos ni siquiera abarcan todas las normas de trabajo fundamentales de 
la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Los alcances de los códigos de empresas y de los 
códigos de asociaciones comerciales a menudo son más limitados que los elaborados en 
conjunción con otras partes interesadas. También se observan diferencias en la cobertura de los 
códigos. Aunque muchos no cubren a los proveedores de la empresa, a menudo no abarcan 
toda la cadena de suministro y muy raramente abarcan a los trabajadores a domicilio. La 
aplicación de un código particular a los fines de una vigilancia efectiva es fundamental si se 
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 desea que éste tenga una repercusión real. Se observan igualmente defectos a este respecto, ya 
que sólo un pequeño porcentaje de los códigos prevé la vigilancia independiente.  
 
Es necesario señalar algunas limitaciones, al evaluar los códigos de conducta. Algunas de éstas 
son de naturaleza práctica, debidas al modo de aplicación de los códigos hasta el momento. 
Otras son inherentes a los códigos como instrumentos, por lo que van más allá de las 
limitaciones relacionadas con el modo de aplicación de los códigos en el pasado. A pesar de la 
proliferación reciente de los códigos, su aplicación sigue siendo relativamente limitada. Otras 
desventajas están relacionadas con el número limitado de cuestiones que abordan y a las que se 
aplican dichos códigos. Las limitaciones estructurales más arraigadas de los códigos de 
conducta están relacionadas con los motores de su proliferación en el decenio de 1990. No 
sólo se limitan a sectores concretos, donde las marcas comerciales y la imagen empresarial son 
importantes, sino que también se aplican principalmente a las empresas dedicadas a la 
exportación. Por último, los códigos de conducta tienden a centrarse en cuestiones particulares 
 las consideradas potencialmente muy peligrosas para que las empresas se asocien con ellas. Es 
decir, es probable que las cuestiones de gran repercusión en países desarrollados ocupen un 
lugar destacado en la mayoría de los códigos.  
 
No obstante las limitaciones de los códigos, éstos pueden y han proporcionado beneficios a las 
partes interesadas. En ejemplos específicos de mejora de las condiciones de trabajo, se muestra 
que los códigos pueden influir en el comportamiento empresarial. Además, debido a los 
códigos de conducta, las empresas asumen cada vez más la responsabilidad de las actividades 
realizadas por sus proveedores y sus propias filiales. 
 
Sin embargo, cabe el peligro de que los códigos se consideren algo más de lo que son en 
realidad, y de que se utilicen para desviar las críticas y reducir la demanda de reglamentación 
externa. En algunos casos, los códigos han empeorado la situación que pretendían mejorar. Se 
ha expresado inquietud por que tiendan a menoscabar la posición de los sindicatos en el lugar 
de trabajo.  
 
Es indudable que los peligros y limitaciones de los códigos de conducta identificados en este 
documento son reales. Así pues, es importante elaborar estrategias que aseguren que los 
códigos sean complementarios a la legislación del gobierno y que faciliten la sindicación de los 
trabajadores. Es más probable que esto suceda más bien cuando se trata de códigos elaborados 
por varios grupos de interés que cuando son diseñados de un modo unilateral por empresas o 
asociaciones empresariales. Los códigos de conducta deberían considerarse una esfera de 
confrontación política, y no una solución a los problemas ocasionados por la mundialización de 
la actividad económica.  
 
Rhys Jenkins es Profesor de Estudios sobre Desarrollo de la Universidad de East Anglia (Reino 
Unido). 
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 1. Introduction 
The 1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis on 
corporate responsibility. This was a result of economic developments in the 1980s, which saw a 
major shift away from the social democratic and Keynesian interventionism of the postwar 
period in the North, and from import substituting industrialization and statism in the South. 
The emphasis on monetarist economic policies and increased integration of international 
markets for goods and finance, the massive privatization of state assets and, in developing 
countries, the shift to trade liberalization and export promotion, all served to redefine the 
economic role of the state. 
 
The change in the role of the state and the increased reliance on market forces has not been 
unproblematic, however. Capitalism has always required the establishment of certain rules of 
the game in order to avoid being subject to the law of the jungle. Yet both the ideological 
shifts of the 1980s, and the globalization of economic activity, meant that nation states have 
been less willing and less able, to perform many of these regulatory functions in recent years. 
 
It is in this context that a new emphasis has been placed on self-regulation and the social 
responsibility of business. Corporate codes of conduct are a manifestation of this in the areas of 
labour and environmental standards, and of human rights. Instead of the social and 
environmental impacts of big business being seen as issues primarily for governments to deal 
with, they are now regarded as matters of corporate responsibility for which companies 
themselves, or their trade associations, should set standards. 
 
This paper sets out to explain in more detail the changes that have taken place in corporate 
regulation, and to assess the significance of these changes. It explores the drivers that account 
for the growth of corporate codes of conduct, and the different stakeholders and interest groups 
involved. Although codes have been developed covering various issues, of which the most 
prominent are labour standards, environmental impact and human rights, the focus of this 
paper will be primarily on the first of these. Environmental codes have a longer history and 
have tended to be less conflictual than those dealing with labour issues. Since the tendency has 
been to develop labour and environmental codes separately (see Blowfield, 1999), it is viable to 
concentrate on those dealing with labour rights, although some reference will also be made to 
environmental codes. 
2. Changes in the Regulation of Corporate Activity 
When the postwar international economic order was established, it was originally intended that 
there should be three major international organizations: the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization. The failure of the United States to 
ratify the Havana Charter, which established the last of these, meant that it never got off the 
ground and international trade rules were governed for four decades (prior to the creation of 
the World Trade Organization) by a much more ad hoc arrangement, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The ITO also included provisions for the protection of investment 
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and the control of restrictive business practices but, as these did not come within the purview of 
the GATT, the postwar system left the activities of international business unregulated. 
 
This refers to regulation at the international level: individual nation states were, of course, able 
to impose controls on foreign corporations that operated in their territory, but no 
comprehensive framework of international regulation for such activities existed. From the 
Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944 onwards, an international framework of labour standards 
with the various conventions of the International Labour Organization did develop. However, 
these conventions were essentially addressed to the Member States (as the principal actors in a 
public international law regime) (Hepple, 1999). They placed certain obligations on 
governmentsfor instance to permit freedom of association and collective bargainingbut did 
not directly address the behaviour of international business. 
 
It was not until the 1970s, with the emergence of a more critical attitude toward transnational 
corporations (TNCs)in developing countries in particular1that there was a major effort to 
develop international standards for corporate behaviour. Although the first proposal of this 
kind, the International Chamber of Commerces Guidelines for International Investment of 
1972, came from the corporate sector itself, most of the efforts emanated from international 
organizations, particularly United Nations agencies. The demand for a New International 
Economic Order was part of a general climate of change, which saw Southern governments 
become more assertive in international economic negotiations in the aftermath of the OPEC oil 
price rises. 
 
In 1974 the United Nations set up its Centre on Transnational Corporations following the 
Report of the Group of Eminent Persons set up by the UN Economic and Social Council. This 
led to the development of a Draft Code of Conduct on TNCs, which set out a framework for 
regulation. Several specialized UN agencies also developed codes covering particular aspects of 
TNC behaviour. These included the ILOs Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977) and UNCTADs proposed codes on 
Restrictive Business Practices and on the Transfer of Technology.  
 
In the same period the OECD adopted its Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprise (1976). This was an attempt by the governments of the North to 
respond to the growing criticism of TNCs from the South, while at the same time making it 
clear that they were not prepared to see excessive controls imposed on TNC activity. It was 
described by one commentator as a pre-emptive Western strike emphasizing business 
responsibility (Robinson, 1983) and was voluntary and not legally binding. 
 
International efforts to regulate TNCs were paralleled in the 1970s by a more restrictive climate 
at the national level in many countries in the South. Some 22 developing countries passed 
                                                           
1 A significant event that focused attention on the activities of TNCs in developing countries was the ITT scandal in 
Chile in the early 1970s, when it was revealed that the US company had been involved in attempts to overthrow the 
democratically elected Popular Unity government led by Salvador Allende. 
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legislation controlling TNC activities in the late 1960s and 1970s (Hepple, 1999). Nationalization 
of foreign corporations reached a peak in the first half of the 1970s (Jenkins, 1999). Regional 
agreements such as the Andean Pact imposed controls on incoming investors. 
 
A common perception that underlay these efforts at regulation was that the interests of TNCs 
and those of host countries in the South did not coincide. Although what was good for General 
Motors might have been good for the United States, it was not necessarily good for Brazil or 
Mexico. Economic development could best be promoted, not by a policy of total openness to 
foreign capital, but by regulation, which would ensure that foreign investment was channelled 
into the areas where it could make a particular contribution. Foreign investors were also 
required to promote local development through joint ventures, local purchasing and 
indigenization policies. The role of the international codes of conduct proposed during this 
period was largely to improve the bargaining power of Southern states in their efforts to obtain 
a greater share of the benefits from the activities of TNCs.2 
 
The 1980s, as already noted, saw a major shift in the attitude toward TNCs, which reflected a 
more general shift toward market-based policies and away from state intervention in both 
developed and developing countries. Sectors which had been closed to foreign capital began to 
open up once more in the 1980s. This began with manufacturing and, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, partly as a result of privatization, it was extended to public utilities and natural 
resources. Access to certain service sectors, which were traditionally closed to foreign capital, 
also started to be liberalized (UNCTAD, 1994:294). 
 
At the same time most of the countries that had imposed across-the-board restrictions on 
foreign ownership abandoned them by the 1990s. The trend toward less strict ownership 
requirements began in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and has resulted in a reduction in the use of 
5050 joint ventures and minority-owned subsidiaries by US TNCs in developing countries 
(Contractor, 1990). Similarly, restrictions on profit repatriation and the terms permitted in 
technology transfer agreements have been relaxed, as have performance requirements 
regarding local content and exports. 
 
In contrast to the 1970s, the attitude of Southern governments has shifted emphasis 
dramatically toward attracting, rather than regulating, TNCs and foreign investment. As 
UNCTADs Division of Transnational Corporations and Investment, which took over the work 
of UNCTC after it was dissolved, noted in 1995: 
 
The mid-1990s are characterized by a general movement towards the 
liberalization and facilitation of FDI. Today, inward FDI policy regimes of 
quite different countries around the world are broadly liberal in character 
They (governments) are fine-tuning their policies to attract capital, technology 
and skills, and to facilitate access to markets with the help of FDI (UNCTAD, 
1995:272). 
 
                                                           
2 In this context it is interesting to note that one of the roles played by the UNCTC in this period was to provide 
training and advice to developing country governments on negotiation strategies vis-à-vis TNCs. 
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The vast majority of changes in investment regimes in developing countries from the early 
1990s have involved either the removal of existing restrictions or new promotional measures 
(see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Liberalization of foreign investment (19911998) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of countries changing 
investment regime 
35 43 57 49 64 65 76 60 
Number of changes 82 79 102 110 112 114 151 145 
More favourable to FDI 80 79 101 108 106 98 135 136 
Less favourable to FDI 2 - 1 2 6 16 16 9 
Source: UNCTAD, 1999:table IV.1. 
 
Given the change in attitudes among Southern governments, it is hardly surprising that efforts 
at international regulation of TNCs did not prosper during the 1980s. The UNCTC Code was 
never agreed upon, despite being watered down considerably. In a 1993 restructuring of the 
UNs economic and social agencies, the Centre on Transnational Corporations was transferred 
into a Division within UNCTAD.  
 
The two major international codes to survive from the 1970s were those of the OECD and the 
ILO. As already noted, the OECD Guidelines did not represent a genuine attempt to control 
transnationals, but was rather designed to deflect criticism of their activities. It was voluntary in 
nature and had no enforcement mechanisms. Although cases have been taken to the Committee 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which processes matters arising 
from the OECD Guidelines, these are usually dealt with through clarifications of the 
Guidelines. Trade unionists have expressed disappointment with the Committees handling of 
complaints, and even when it has been found that companies have engaged in anti-union 
activities, the Committee has merely reaffirmed the view that management should take a 
positive approach toward union activities (Murray, 1998). 
 
The ILO Declaration is narrower in scope, focusing on the social aspects of TNC activities. Like 
the OECD Guidelines, the Declaration is not binding and compliance is on a voluntary basis. 
Disputes are referred to the Committee on Multinational Enterprises for interpretation of the 
Declaration. It is not a procedure for dispute settlement over compliance with the Declaration. 
During its first decade in operation, the Committee only issued two such interpretations (ILO, 
1989). Like the OECD Guidelines, therefore, the impact of the Declaration has been relatively 
limited. 
 
While the trend in terms of both national and international policies from the late 1970s was 
toward liberalization and deregulation, the same period saw a new trend toward voluntary 
corporate codes of conduct. These began to be adopted in the late 1970s, particularly by US 
corporations, in response to the bad publicity received by TNCs, not only as a result of the ITT 
scandal, but also from revelations about bribery and questionable payments by many leading 
US companies (Kline, 1985:2325). 
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The first wave of corporate codes were predominantly concerned with issues of questionable 
payments. A study of 174 codes in 1978 found that more than half of them covered questionable 
payments.3 Ninety per cent of the codes studied by Kline were formulated after the Securities 
and Exchange Commission began to investigate questionable payments, and the passage by the 
US Congress of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 gave further impetus to this 
movement (Kline, 1985:103). 
 
By the mid-1980s however, Kline (1985:108) was commenting that the public pressure for 
adoption of codes had decreased. The 1990s saw a renewal of interest in corporate codes of 
conduct. The main areas that are now addressed in these codes are environmental and labour 
issues, which contrasts with the emphasis found in the first wave of corporate codes. The OECD 
inventory of 246 codes found that 60 per cent referred to labour standards and 59 per cent to 
environmental stewardship (OECD, 2000:figure 3).4 In contrast, only 23 per cent of codes in the 
1990s addressed the issue of bribery. 
 
The second wave of corporate codes began to emerge in the early 1990s. Levi Strauss, with its 
Business Partner Terms of Engagement adopted in 1992, was one of the first companies to 
establish this type of code, and it was followed in the United States by a number of other 
clothing manufacturers and retailers (Sajhau, 1997). By the mid-1990s, the fashion for codes had 
spread to Europe and a number of companies in the United Kingdom and on the continent were 
beginning to take them up. Again clothing manufacturers and retailers were among the first to 
adopt codes covering labour conditions. These included C&A, Otto Versand in Germany and 
the Pentland Group in the United Kingdom. 
 
Although comprehensive codes are relatively limited in number, they are being introduced by a 
growing number of companies, and there is a trend for the scope of codes to expand as 
company experience with them increases.5 Their significance, if any, lies in the fact that they are 
being adopted by leading corporations in their fields, such as Levi Strauss and Gap in clothing, 
Nike and Reebok in sports goods, and the major British supermarkets in retailing. 
 
Although sharing a common nomenclature, corporate codes of conduct are very different from 
the international codes that were proposed in the 1970s, particularly the UNCTC Draft Code. 
The latter were seen as a means of regulation of TNCs by international bodies, which would 
support or supplement national state regulation. Corporate codes are voluntary initiatives, 
which have been adopted by the business sector itself. These codes range from vague 
declarations of business principles applicable to international operations, to more substantive 
efforts at self-regulation. 
 
                                                           
3 Survey by the Foundation of the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking quoted in Kline (1985:105). 
4 This contrasts with the 1978 survey by the Foundation of the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking quoted in 
Kline (1985:105) which found that only 14 per cent of codes dealt with social aspects. 
5 This is not invariably the case. Shells Revised Statement of General Business Principles, published in 1997, made no 
reference to labour standards despite the fact that an earlier statement in 1990 referred to both the OECD Guidelines 
and the ILO Declaration.  
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The international codes were seen in the main as an attempt to redress the balance between the 
growing power of TNCs and the nation states, particularly in the South, where they invested. 
They emerged from a perception that the growth of giant international companies posed a 
threat to the sovereignty of small, poor states. A common perception at the time was that of 
sovereignty at bay6. International regulation was seen as necessary in order to ensure that 
developing countries shared in the gains from the growth of international corporate activity. 
 
The recent wave of corporate codes has tended to focus on the impact of TNCs in two main 
areassocial conditions and the environment. They are part of a much wider debate concerning 
the impact of globalization on labour and the environment, which is also reflected in the call for 
social and environmental clauses in trade agreements and within the WTO. Whereas support 
for codes in the 1970s came mainly from the South, and particularly from Southern 
governments7, in the 1990s support came mainly from the developed world. Here international 
trade union organizations, development and environmental NGOs and the corporate sector 
itself have all contributed to the demand for some form of code of conduct for international 
business. 
 
Although the range of issues covered by the corporate codes of the 1990s tends to be more 
focused than the comprehensive efforts of the 1970s, in another respect the scope of the more 
recent codes is broader. Whereas the 1970s emphasized the activities of TNCs and their 
subsidiaries, in the 1990s this was extended to include a responsibility for the labour and 
environmental practices of their suppliers as well as their direct activities. Indeed for many 
companies, the major impetus behind their code of conduct is to ensure acceptable behaviour 
on the part of their subcontractors. 
3. The International Context of the Growth of Corporate 
    Codes of Conduct 
As was indicated in the last section, voluntary self-regulation has become an important feature 
of the world economy, while meaningful efforts by national governments and international 
organizations to control the activities of TNCs have been declining. Before discussing the 
responses of the various stakeholders who are affected by transnational corporate activities, the 
global context, which has affected the growth of corporate codes of conduct, will be analysed 
briefly. 
 
The impacts of globalization have been widespread. Since the 1970s, trade barriers have been 
further reduced and many more countries have been integrated into the global economy. The 
end of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the opening up of 
China and Viet Nam, as well as more liberal policies in many developing countries (particularly 
significant in India) have meant increased scope for the operation of TNCs. On one estimate, the 
                                                           
6 This was the title of a book written by one of the leading academic authorities on TNCs, Ray Vernon, in 1971, 
although his view was in fact critical of the belief that the nation state was decisively weakened by TNC expansion. 
7 Northern governments and companies were on the whole resistant to such codes, unless they were voluntary and 
could be used to head off the demand for binding international regulation. 
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proportion of the worlds population taking part in the global economy has increased from 
around a quarter to four-fifths. 
 
Foreign investment and the activities of TNCs have grown even more rapidly than global trade 
in this period. But the changing nature of global corporations means that these figures 
underestimate the true extent of their international activities. A significant factor here has been 
the growth of global commodity or value chains in many industries (Gereffi, 1999; 
Kaplinsky, 2000). While trade has always been a significant feature, what is new is the ability to 
control production over large distances without exercising ownership. A variety of consumer 
goods, including garments, footwear and vegetables, are characterized by value chains in which 
control of the chain resides with brand name producers such as Levi Strauss and Nike, or large 
retailers such as WalMart and Tesco. 
 
A key feature of the development of such buyer-driven value chains is that the buyer ensures 
that the producers meet delivery dates, quality standards, design specifications and so on. In 
other words, the buyer controls many of the aspects of production carried out by the producer. 
It is then but a short step to argue that the buyer should also take responsibility for the 
conditions under which subcontractors operate, in terms of their relations with labour and their 
impact on the environment. It is often these types of industries that saw explicit codes of 
conduct introduced in the 1990s. 
 
Another important structural feature has been the growing importance of intangible assets8 in 
the valuation of major corporations. Ernst and Young contrast Traditional Companies in 
which intangibles account for 43 per cent of the share price with Tomorrows Companies in 
which they make up 65 per cent (Gonella et al., 1998, fig.2.2) This is often associated with brand 
names, which in turn leads to the concept of corporate reputation. A company such as Nike, 
which does not carry out its own manufacturing processes, and which spends heavily on 
advertising and promotion in order to establish a corporate image, is highly vulnerable to 
anything that would tarnish that image. In a similar vein, the CEO of Levi Strauss, Bob Haas, 
stated in 1994 that In todays world a TV expose on working conditions can undo years of 
effort to build brand loyalty (quoted in Zeldenrust and Ascoly, 1998:14). Critically then, it is 
the growing importance of brand names which enables large corporations to earn large profits 
and acts as a major barrier to other firms entering the market, which also makes them 
vulnerable to challenges on their labour or environmental policies (Klein, 2000). 
 
Changing public attitudes are also an important part of the context in which corporate codes of 
conduct have been adopted. The awareness of environmental issues has increased significantly 
since the 1970s. Companies in the North can no longer ignore the impact of their activities on 
the environment with impunity. Moreover, new legislation has meant that corporate liability for 
environmental damage is a factor that companies have to be responsive to. 
 
                                                           
8 A firms market value is made up of physical assets, such as plant and equipment and land; financial assets 
(currency, bank deposits, shares); and intangible assets, which are not tangible items of property (Beynon, 1999:155).  
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The developments in global communications, which have enabled corporations to control 
production activities on an ever widening scale, have also facilitated the international 
transmission of information that companies would prefer not to have widely disseminated 
(ONeill, 1999). The speed with which information about working conditions in a subsidiary or 
subcontractor of a multinational corporation somewhere in Asia can be made available to 
NGOs and consumers in North America is unprecedented (Kearney, 1999:208).  
4. Stakeholders and Their Attitudes toward Codes of Conduct 
The precise definition of who are the stakeholders in relation to transnational corporate activity 
will depend on the particular sector concerned. In the case of mining it will include the local 
community whose lives are likely to be disrupted by the opening of a new mine. In the case of 
horticultural products it will be necessary to distinguish between large landowners, 
smallholders and landless labourers. However, without going into the specifics of particular 
sectors, some broad generalizations can be made that can be applied, with suitable 
modifications, to different situations. 
(a) Large corporations 
Although the precise structure of each value chain differs, large corporations tend to be the 
target of NGO campaigners and have taken a lead in adopting codes of conduct. In some cases, 
they are large supermarket chains such as Sainsbury and Tesco buying horticultural products, 
or retailers such as C&A in Europe and WalMart and Sears in the United States purchasing 
garments. In other cases they are sellers of branded products such as Levi Strauss in clothing 
and Nike and Reebok in sports footwear. They may have some overseas production but mostly 
rely on foreign contractors to manufacture their products. Other large companies are more 
directly involved in foreign production as in the case of oil or mining companies such as Shell, 
BP Amoco and RTZ. 
 
These companies have a high public profile and tend to rely heavily on their corporate image. 
As such they have been particularly vulnerable to negative publicity and NGO campaigns. It is 
not uncommon for a code to be adopted by such companies in the aftermath of some major 
event that has been a public relations disaster for the company concerned. Shell, for example, 
incorporated human rights into its code of conduct as a result of the criticism of its Nigerian 
operations following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa (Amnesty International, 2000:94). BP 
Amoco was similarly severely criticized for alleged complicity with human rights violations in 
Colombia (Financial Times, 1999:19). 
 
In some cases, corporations may adopt a code of conduct simply to pre-empt external pressure. 
Consultants have explicitly advocated such a strategy to deal with criticism from watchdogs. 
A.L. Roinick, writing in the US textile industry magazine Bobbin, recommends that: 
 
8 
CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
RHYS JENKINS 
Although following these steps will not guarantee that you will not be bitten 
by the watchdog, they should ensure that any bites you get will be nips as 
opposed to gashes that require rabies shots (quoted in Clean Clothes 
Campaign, 1999). 
 
Codes of conduct can also be used as a means of heading off more draconian measures that 
might be applied to business. The United States Council for International Business, which has 
argued against legally binding standards, points out that: 
 
to the extent business regulates itself, develops and implements best 
practices, and cooperates with the business community in other countries, the 
pressure for new rules may be tempered. Positive efforts on the part of 
business to confront legitimate concerns about social and environmental 
issues will also help blunt the efforts of trade unions and NGOs who seek to 
control corporate behavior in the pursuit of their objectives (quoted in 
Zeldenrust and Ascoly, 1998:45). 
 
There is a history of companies adopting some kind of code as the lesser of two evils. Thus US 
companies accepted the Sullivan Principles for doing business in South Africa in the apartheid 
era, as an alternative to a boycott, which would have put their investments in jeopardy. 
 
In addition to a pre-emptive motive, codes of conduct at a sectoral level can be a means of 
levelling the playing field, or giving a competitive advantage to the sectoral leaders. In highly 
competitive industries, a company will be unable to improve working conditions or reduce 
environmental damage unless its competitors do the same. In such a situation, where a market 
leader feels that it needs to act to protect its image, it will be in its interest to negotiate a sector-
wide agreement to ensure that its competitors have to meet the same standards. Given that a 
large company is likely to be better placed to monitor its suppliers than a smaller one, such 
measures may even tilt the playing field slightly in its favour. Thus the motive behind the 
adoption of a code may be self-interest. 
 
It may also be the case that the adoption of ethical principles can increase the commitment of 
company staff. If a corporation relies heavily on attracting motivated personnel, such an 
approach can help raise productivity and improve overall performance. The British 
organization, Investors in People (IIP) claims that high productivity requires committed staff, 
which in turn requires a company to earn that commitment (Gonella et al., 1999:14). The Body 
Shop is often quoted as an example of a company that has used such a strategy successfully.  
 
It is debatable how far such considerations would lead to the widespread adoption of codes of 
conduct in the absence of external pressures. Indeed it is striking how the adoption of corporate 
codes of conduct reflects such pressures, both in terms of timing and content. As was 
mentioned above, the first wave of corporate codes of conduct in the late 1970s focused on 
bribery and questionable payments in the aftermath of investigations by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. More recently a number of environmental disasters, most notably that 
at Bhopal, prompted firms to adopt environmental codes, while revelations concerning child 
labour and working conditions have motivated firms to include labour issues. Yet the potential 
benefits that large companies may derive from corporate responsibility mean that they will not 
9 
UNRISD PROGRAMME ON TECHNOLOGY, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 
PAPER NUMBER 2 
 
necessarily be resistant to the adoption of codes, although this will differ between firms and 
sectors. 
(b) Smaller producers 
Small firms in the North may be less interested in codes of conduct than the larger retailers and 
producers of branded goods discussed above. They are less visible to the public and less likely 
to attract the attention of campaigning NGOs, so that the external pressures on them are less 
intense. They also usually work within much tighter margins than the larger firms, and are 
therefore less able to absorb any increased costs associated with better labour or environmental 
conditions. Furthermore, where a code of conduct requires the buyer to monitor conditions at 
the plants of suppliers, smaller firms are much worse placed to do so than their larger 
competitors. All these factors imply that small producers are less likely to adopt or support 
codes of conduct. 
 
In some value chains, the differences between firms may be between retailers and 
manufacturers. In the UK toy industry, for instance, it has been found that there is much greater 
interest in establishing verifiable good practice among toy retailers than among manufacturers 
(Murray, 1998:61). 
 
Under certain circumstances it is possible that small firms have a specific interest in seeing that 
larger producers adopt codes of conduct. Small producers manufacture domestically, whereas 
larger firms source internationally. Smaller producers may have a protectionist motive for 
supporting higher labour or environmental standards overseas. Further work on the political 
economy of codes would be required to reveal whether this has, in practice, played a part in 
their development. 
(c) Northern NGOs 
The 1990s saw a considerable increase in NGO activism around issues of corporate 
responsibility. No doubt this was partly a response to the perception that governments were not 
effective in controlling the activities of large corporations, following the deregulation of the 
1980s.9 There was also an increased awareness of the power and influence of TNCs among NGO 
activists, who became concerned that unregulated globalization would have negative social and 
environmental consequences in developing countries.10 
 
Three major areas of the impact of TNCs became a focus of NGO campaigns. First there were 
issues of labour rights. These were taken up by development NGOs such as Oxfam, Christian 
Aid and the Catholic Institute for International Relations. Some focused on specific issues 
within their remit, such as Save the Children Fund focused on child labour. Campaigning 
                                                           
9 As Jessica Woodroffe of the World Development Movement points out, Some governments are unwilling to 
regulate multinationals. A downward spiral is occurring where Third World governments are pressured to reduce 
standards in order to compete for foreign investment. Other governments are unable to stand up to the powerful 
multinationals to enforce their own legislation (Woodroffe, 1999:132). 
10 See OReilly and Tickell (1999) for a discussion of Oxfams reasons for becoming increasingly involved in issues of 
corporate responsibility in the late 1990s. 
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specifically around labour issues, new NGOs or coalitions of NGOs emerged, such as the Clean 
Clothes Campaign in Europe and the Coalition for Justice in Maquila in the Americas. 
 
A second area that came to prominence was human rights, particularly in relation to the actions 
of security forces and the rights of indigenous peoples. Mining and oil companies, opening up 
new sources of natural resources in the South, often found themselves in conflict with 
indigenous groups in the areas where they operated. Frequently the nation state, interested in 
expanding exports and increasing tax revenues and extractive royalties, repressed local 
opposition to the expansion of extractive activities. Thus TNCs found themselves conniving, at 
least tacitly, in the suppression of the indigenous population. The most prominent example of 
this was the involvement of Shell in Nigeria, and the repression of the Ogoni people (Amnesty 
International, 2000:94). Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
have raised the question of the impact of TNCs on human rights.  
 
Finally, NGOs have also been active in highlighting the effect of corporate actions on the 
environment. Shell was once more the high profile target of the Greenpeace campaign against 
the dumping of the Brent Spar oil platform in the North Sea. Other examples have arisen of 
campaigns against the environmental impact of mining TNCs as, for example, in the case of 
BHP in Papua New Guinea. Friends of the Earth drafted a model code of conduct for mining 
projects in 1997. 
 
Northern NGOs see codes of conduct as one element in the regulation of international business. 
Given the lack of an inter-governmental system for regulating TNCs, they see comprehensive 
codes of conduct, which are effectively monitored and independently verified, as a means of 
constraining corporate power. However, codes should complement government regulation and 
not be seen as a substitute for it. 
 
In some cases there has been a tendency for NGOs to concentrate on issues that have an 
immediate appeal and can evoke a popular response. Child labour is a case in point, although a 
number of NGOs have argued that a simple ban on the use of child labour might be counter-
productive in terms of raising living standards. Indigenous rights is another issue which has 
been taken up prominently by NGOs. 
 
It is in fact difficult to generalize about the position of NGOs in relation to codes of conduct 
because of the wide variety of organizations that tackle the issue. Environmental NGOs tend to 
focus primarily on environmental codes, while development NGOs tend to concentrate more on 
labour rights. However, what is clear is that, in a number of instances, NGO activism, by 
threatening a companys reputation, has forced those who are targeted to respond in some way. 
Often the response is to adopt a code of conduct, or where one already exists, to revise it to 
alleviate criticisms. Thus NGO pressure has played an important role in putting codes on 
corporate agendas. 
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(d) Trade un ons i
l
Another interest group that has been at the fore in advocating codes of conduct covering social 
issues, and has a direct interest in their application, is the trade union movement. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions produced a draft code of conduct in 1996. 
 
At the sectoral level, several international trade secretariats have also been involved in 
developing codes of conduct and negotiating framework agreements, which can include a code 
of conduct, with employers. The International Textile, Garments and Leather Workers 
Federation (ITGLWF) participated in developing codes of conduct with the European Textile 
and Garment Employers (EUROTEX); and the European Footwear Employers was one of the 
parties involved in developing the FIFA-sponsored code for footballs (Kearney, 1999). Similarly 
the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied 
Workers Associations (IUF) has played a role in establishing codes with the French TNC 
Danone and with the ACCOR hotel chain. The International Federation of Building and Wood 
Workers (IFBWW) has an agreement with IKEA that covers suppliers and incorporates the ILO 
core standards (Justice, undated). 
 
An important concern for the trade unions is to prevent the erosion of workers rights through 
the exploitation of unorganized workers in the South. A major factor for them is support for the 
various ILO conventions, particularly the core labour standards that relate to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.  
 
Trade unions regard codes as an inferior means of securing labour rights compared to the self-
organization of workers in trade unions and collective bargaining (Justice, undated:3). They are 
also sceptical of unilateral codes adopted by companies and those of trade associations, which 
they regard as public relations exercises (Kearney, 1999:209). While trade unions stress that 
codes of conduct should not be seen as a substitute for national legislation effectively 
implemented by governments, nor as an alternative to trade union representation and collective 
bargaining (Kearney, 1999:208), they have in some cases negotiated codes of conduct with 
companies which have real bite. Despite reservations that they may create alternative channels 
of representation, trade unions have supported specific codes on the grounds that they give a 
space for workers to organize and may, if they become widespread, provide a platform from 
which governments can develop new mechanisms to enforce labour legislation (Kearney, 
1999:209). 
(e) Shareho ders and investors 
Given the separation of ownership and management in the modern corporation, it is necessary 
to identify shareholders as a distinct stakeholder in relation to corporate codes of conduct. 
Ultimately shareholders interests are in the value of the shares of the companies in which they 
have invested. In a minority of cases, however, they are also interested in the ethical behaviour 
of the companies in which they invest. This is the case both for some individual investors and 
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for institutional investors. The latter include religious organizations, ethical or green 
investment funds and some pension funds.11 
 
Even in cases where ethical investment criteria are used, from the investors point of view these 
should not render the asset financially unattractive. This places a limit on the extent to which 
shareholders are prepared to push for the adoption of such policies. However, against this, 
there is evidence to suggest that taking such factors into account does not, in practice, adversely 
affect returns. Indeed some analysts claim that companies that behave ethically perform better, 
and that failure to do so can damage the financial position of a company (Sajhau, 1997:4; 
Gonella et al., 1998:13). It has also been suggested that the stock market reacts unfavourably to 
adverse environmental news about a company (such as criticism of its environmental impacts) 
and positively when good environmental performance is recognized (Dasgupta et al., 1999, and 
references cited therein). 
 
The extent to which stock markets are a major factor in promoting corporate responsibility is 
open to question. Despite the recent rapid growth of ethical funds in the United Kingdom, they 
have only just broken through to take more than 1 per cent of the market (Cowe, 2000). With 
such a small market share, these funds have minimal impact on the share price of individual 
companies (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000:84). This may change in the future, however. Since July 
2000 new government legislation has required all UK pension funds to state which social, 
environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in their investment policies. 
This has led some mainstream fund managers, who in the past have taken no account of 
corporate social responsibility in their investment decisions, to start addressing these issues 
(Henderson Investors, 2000). 
 
Although initially ethical funds were characterized by avoiding investment in companies with 
operations in particular sectors that were considered unethical, such as tobacco or armaments, 
recently the criteria for ethical investment have become more sophisticated. In the United 
States, which has a much longer history of ethical investment than the United Kingdom, 
investment in ethically screened portfolios doubled between 1997 and 1999, increasing their 
share of professionally managed investments from 9 per cent to 13 per cent (Amnesty 
International, 2000:69). 
 
The stock market is not the only way in which the influence of shareholders can make itself felt. 
In the United States active engagement has become a routine way of pressuring companies to 
adopt ethical policies (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000). Minority shareholders have tabled 
resolutions and raised questions concerning the ethical behaviour of companies. This first arose 
in relation to companies with investments in South Africa, but has subsequently been extended 
to other issues (see Amnesty International, 2000:68, for specific examples). Institutional 
shareholders have significant power in this regard. In the United States, the Interfaith Centre for 
Global Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), which brings together 275 religious institutional 
investors who hold a portfolio estimated at around $110 billion, have been extremely active in 
                                                           
11 In the United Kingdom the university lecturers pension fund, USS, has adopted an ethical investment policy.  
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this area, sponsoring 140 resolutions related to over a hundred companies (ICCR, 2000:23). In 
the United Kingdom, however, shareholder activism has been less extensive than in the United 
States (Lewis and Mackenzie, 2000:86). 
 
The need to develop criteria on which to base their investment to ensure ethical corporate 
behaviour in the fields of human rights, and social and environmental issues has led the 
churches to develop their own code of conduct. This led to the Principles for Global Corporate 
Responsibility: Benchmarks for Corporate Responsibility proposed by the ICCR in the United 
States, the Ecumenical Committee for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) in the United Kingdom 
and the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) in Canada.  
 
Given that the primary responsibility of managers continues to be to their shareholders, the 
growth of shareholder activism around ethical and environmental issues has a potential to alter 
corporate behaviour, at least as far as publicly quoted companies are concerned. Moreover, 
whereas pressure organized around consumption tends only to apply to companies which 
produce consumer products, and particularly those which rely heavily on branding and image, 
shareholder pressure can be brought to bear on quoted companies operating in any sector of the 
economy, whether or not they are a household name. 
 
Codes of conduct can be one way of assuring shareholders and investment funds that a 
company does meet certain ethical standards. As the criteria on which ethical investors base 
their decisions are extended beyond the avoidance of holdings in certain unethical industries, 
it is possible that the adoption of a code of conduct could become an important indicator of a 
firms ethical stance. However, the extent to which investors will insist on adequate monitoring 
and verification of such codes, in order to be assured that the fund is meeting its ethical 
objectives, is yet to be seen. 
(f) Consumers 
It is often claimed that as consumers become more aware of the impacts of production on 
labour and the environment, they demand ethically produced goods. Codes of conduct are then 
simply a response by firms to consumer preferences expressed in the marketplace. The current 
UK Secretary for State for International Development, Clare Short, has explicitly adopted this 
view, stating that Codes have come into existence because consumers do not want to purchase 
goods produced by exploiting workers here or abroad (Ferguson, 1998:foreword). While at 
first sight plausible, the role of consumer demand needs to be problematized.  
 
In a market economy, the consumer is individualized and her/his decisions can have little or no 
influence on producer decisions. In other words, there is a problem of collective action as far as 
consumers trying to change the overall ethical behaviour of a firm is concerned (Rodrik quoted 
in Lee, 1997:10). Of course, this is not to say that there is not a market for products with an 
ethical dimension, as the growth in demand for fair-traded coffee illustrates. Some consumers 
obviously do value such a product and are prepared to pay a premium price for it. However 
such examples remain niche markets supplying a predominantly middle class customer base. 
Their market penetration remains very limited (Cowe, 2000). 
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Theoretically, therefore, there is reason to be sceptical about the likely impact of consumers as 
such bringing about greater corporate responsibility. In fact, what is often referred to as 
consumer pressure is usually political pressure from civil society, orchestrated by NGOs, which 
uses the threat of consumer action to achieve this end. There are relatively few cases where 
there appear to have been significant actual effects on consumer demand for a particular 
product or range. The most notable are boycotts, such as the boycott of South African products 
during the apartheid era, and of Nestlé in reaction to the baby milk scandal. 
 
The logic of the argument above applies to the individualized consumer of the economics 
textbooks. However, not all consumers are individuals, and it may well be possible to affect 
corporate behaviour through consumer pressure. This can be seen, for instance, in cases where 
local authorities are a major purchaser from a corporation. Although there are many instances 
where local governments have attempted to use their buying power in an ethical way, this has 
been severely circumscribed in recent years by the actions of national governments. In the 
United States, the Supreme Court struck down the attempt by the state of Massachusetts to 
prevent companies with activities in Myanmar from participating in state contracts. In the 
United Kingdom, local government legislation passed under the Conservative government has 
limited the ability of councils to take non-financial considerations into account in awarding 
contracts. 
 
Another example of pressure from collective consumers has been the movement in US 
universities to ensure that the sportswear supplied with their name and logo is not produced in 
sweatshop conditions. Again, because firms are faced with bulk purchasers rather than 
individualized consumers, this has evoked a corporate response.12 As in the case of local 
authorities, this is a result of political decisions and mobilizations, rather than the development 
of consumer preferences. 
 
With the exception of these collective purchasers, therefore, the majority of consumers are 
mainly concerned with value for money. A study in Canada found that only 5 per cent of 
consumers were willing to pay more for fair-traded products (Forcese quoted in Utting, 
2000:27). While a minority have an interest in buying ethically produced goods, the majority are 
unwilling to pay more for such products. 
(g) Consultancy firms and verifiers 
The proliferation of codes of conduct and other related activities in the areas of environmental 
and social management, and auditing, has created a rapidly growing sector of consultants and 
verifiers who have an interest in the growth of these activities. Accountancy firms such as Ernst 
and Young and PriceWaterhouse Coopers have expanded into this area. Verifiers who have 
been involved in auditing quality standards, such as ISO 9000, have also moved into 
environmental and social auditing.  
                                                           
12 In the case of Nike, the response was to withdraw sponsorship from some universities which supported the anti-
sweatshop campaign. Although this was not the response sought by the campaigners, it does indicate that firms are 
influenced by the actions of collective consumers. 
15 
UNRISD PROGRAMME ON TECHNOLOGY, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 
PAPER NUMBER 2 
 
 
These firms have a direct interest in the formalization of codes of conduct, and ensuring that 
codes move beyond mere statements of business principles to include verifiable standards and 
clear procedures for monitoring (Burns et al., 1997:2829). However, since most of these 
organizations are moving into social auditing from other fields, they are likely to bring with 
them the procedures and attitudes which apply elsewhere, and this may introduce a particular 
slant to their approach toward codes of conduct. 
 
Since monitoring reports are usually produced in confidence for the companies which 
commission them and the entire process lacks transparency, the extent to which this colours the 
way in which monitoring is carried out remains largely unexplored. However, a recent report 
by Dara ORourke (2000) on factory inspections in Asia by PriceWaterhouse Coopers, the 
worlds largest private monitor of labour and environmental practices, raises serious concerns. 
The standard format used by PWC is designed primarily to elicit information from managers 
and does not effectively gather information from workers, or compare the opinions of workers 
and managers. Factory walk-through inspections are brief and cursory, in one case lasting only 
30 minutes. As a result, the inspection team missed a number of flawed labour practices and did 
not give an accurate picture of conditions in the factory. 
 
While it is true that not all the firms involved in labour monitoring have come from the fields of 
accountancy, consultancy and quality control, such firms are playing a leading role in defining 
standards.  
 
PWC is leading the development of corporate monitoring standards and is 
poised to become one of the main auditors for, and most influential 
participants in, the Fair Labor Association and the Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Production (WRAP) monitoring programs. In many ways, PWC is 
setting the standard for what corporate monitors will do, how they will do it, 
and how much they will charge (ORourke, 2000:2). 
(h) Southern exporters 
In developing countries, corporate social responsibility is not generally seen as being very high 
on the business agenda (WBCSD, 2000:1213). In most cases, the demand for codes of conduct 
has been externally driven. Therefore, firms in developing countries, which produce for 
developed country markets, have a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward codes of conduct. On 
one hand, where their customers require them to meet certain labour or environmental 
standards, they need to comply in order to keep their markets. On the other hand, they are 
likely to perceive such measures as increasing their costs, either directly or indirectly. 
 
Where inspections reveal that suppliers are not complying with the code of conduct of their 
customers, then corrective action has to be paid for by the supplier itself in order to comply. 
Suppliers also complain about lack of support in the form of training to meet code 
requirements. In Indonesia, for example, subcontractors often receive no training but are 
required to make and pay for all the changes to be carried out (Kemp, 2000). Since the 
subcontractors generally operate in highly competitive markets, they may find it difficult to 
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pass on such costs. Indeed in an Indonesian case study, it was found that one foreign company 
did not increase its purchase price to the contractor who was required to improve working 
conditions. 
 
This tends to lead to a situation in which the subcontractors favour relatively weak codes of 
conduct, which will meet the requirements of their customers without imposing undue costs. 
Weak codes of conduct are a much more attractive option for them than the incorporation of 
labour standards into trade agreements. They are opposed to any toughening of the regulatory 
regime, or to measures that would strengthen the role of trade unions (Zadek, 2000:16). 
 
Given the proliferation of codes of conduct, exporters are likely to be faced with a variety of 
demands from different companies, each with its own code. This can lead to conflicting 
demands or, at best, considerable transaction costs in meeting the requirements of a range of 
customers. In such circumstances, there are advantages to the exporters in having a single 
industry wide code, or a standardized code covering a limited number of key issues (Burns et 
al., 1997:3122). 
(i) Workers in the South 
In many, but not all, of the industries in which codes of conduct are found, workers are not 
unionized and are often women. In export processing zones where a large share of the garment 
industry is located, exemption is often granted from national labour laws. In horticulture the 
producers are often unorganized.  
 
Relatively little is known about the attitudes of workers in these industries toward codes of 
conduct. Their priorities, however, are not necessarily the same as those that are highlighted in 
many codes. While women workers have an interest in improving their working conditions, it 
has been found that their demands often revolve around issues such as protection of 
employment following pregnancy, prohibition of enforced pregnancy testing and provision of 
safe transport home (Pearson and Seyfang, forthcoming). These specific issues are rarely 
mentioned in codes of conduct. 
 
Codes of conduct may also have a negative effect on the most marginal workers. In horticulture, 
for instance, there is a tendency for production to become centralized and for smallholders to be 
displaced where buyers find it easier to monitor conditions among a reduced number of 
producers. Similarly, efforts to eliminate child labour in the football industry led to production 
being shifted away from homeworking, carried out by women and children, to larger factories 
where men were employed. 
 
Thus while codes of conduct are intended to improve conditions for workers, they do not 
necessarily achieve this. First of all, they may not address the priorities of the workers 
themselves. Second, they may have indirect effects, which actually worsen the position of those 
who were originally employed. 
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(j) Southern NGOs 
It is necessary to treat Southern NGOs separately from their Northern counterparts, as their 
interests are not necessarily identical. They have different constituencies and different priorities. 
Some even argue that Northern NGOs are driving the agenda for the South, and that this is a 
form of ethical imperialism (Murphy and Bendell, 1999:55). Attempts have been made to 
overcome this, through dialogue between Northern and Southern NGOs, such as the 
consultation organized by the NGO Labour Rights Network held in London in 1998 (Green, 
1998). 
 
Southern NGOs have often opposed any measures that could prove to be a non-tariff barrier to 
exports. They are also suspicious of the links that may develop between Northern NGOs and 
business around codes of conduct (Zadek, 2000:16). The danger is that there will be increasing 
co-optation of NGO activists (Utting, 2000:32). However, in some cases, Southern NGOs 
themselves have become involved with codes of conduct as verifiers, as in the case of the Smart 
Wood certification process and the monitoring of the Mandarin factory in El Salvador (Burns et 
al., 1997:36). 
 
Southern NGOs see themselves as augmenting the role of trade unions. This can either be 
through supporting and providing training for trade unions in those areas where they exist, or 
facilitating the organization of groups which traditionally have weak trade union links (women, 
child workers, homeworkers and the informal sector). There is particular concern that NGO 
support for codes of conduct should not take the pressure off governments in terms of 
improving and enforcing labour legislation (Green, 1998). 
(k) Southern governments 
As was indicated earlier in this paper, over the past two decades the priority of Southern 
governments has shifted from controlling TNC activities in their countries, to seeking to attract 
as much foreign direct investment as possible. They are also concerned to promote exports and 
are, therefore, generally favourably disposed toward measures that will help ensure access to 
overseas markets. However, they are concerned about the growth of non-tariff barriers, and 
have strongly opposed attempts to include environmental and social clauses in the WTO. From 
this standpoint, voluntary codes can be seen as a more attractive option for host governments, 
although there are concerns even here that the development of eco-labels and social labels could 
be a form of disguised protectionism. 
(l) Local commun t esi i  
Local communities hold a significant stake in the impact of environmental codes and those that 
refer to indigenous peoples and human rights. However, since the main focus of the paper is on 
codes that address labour issues and the situation of workers in the workplace, the role of local 
communities will not be discussed in any detail here. 
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5. The Morphology of Codes of Conduct 
(a) Sectors 
One of the striking characteristics of the recent growth of codes of conduct is the tendency for 
them to be concentrated in particular sectors. The OECD inventory of codes of conduct 
indicated that the leading sectors in terms of number of firms were trade, textiles, chemicals and 
extractive industries (see table 2). This table includes not only codes which cover labour 
standards, but also those focusing on environmental stewardship, consumer protection, bribery 
and other issues. 
 
Table 2: Sectoral composition of firms issuing codes 
Sector Activity Number of firms 
Primary Agriculture 3 
 Extractive 20 
Secondary Food 7 
 Textile 23 
 Wood 4 
 Petroleum related 12 
 Chemical 22 
 Plastic 5 
 Metal 13 
 Electronics 14 
 Mechanical product 15 
 Office machinery 6 
 Vehicles 10 
 Others 15 
Tertiary Electricity, gas, water 10 
 Construction 6 
 Trade 61 
 Hotel/restaurant 6 
 Transport and communication 12 
 Financial activities 10 
 Real estate and other business 9 
 Others 14 
Source: OECD, 2000:table 2. 
 
More detailed case studies indicate that codes of conduct addressing labour issues tend to be 
concentrated in sectors such as garments, footwear, sports goods, toys and retailing. These 
sectors supply consumer goods and usually involve well-known brand names. They have also 
been the sectors on which NGOs have focused their campaigns to promote ethical trade.13 
 
In contrast, environmental codes are most commonly found in quite different industries. The 
sector that has led in this respect has been the chemical industry, but other sectors where such 
                                                           
13 Examples of such campaigns include the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Labour Behind the Label Network in 
garments, Christian Aids Change the Rules campaign directed at UK supermarkets, the Fair Play for Toy 
Workers campaign co-ordinated by the World Development Movement, the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations and the Trade Union Congress. 
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codes are common include forestry, the oil industry and mining. These tend not to be consumer 
good industries, although in the case of oil, they do produce well-known brand names. They are 
largely process industries, which have significant environmental impact, and may also involve 
hazardous processes. 
(b) Types of codes of conduct 
                                                          
Codes of conduct come in a wide variety of different forms, and this can be a cause of some 
confusion. While it is possible to classify codes in a number of ways, here five main types of 
codes are identified.14 
1. Company codes 
These are codes that are adopted unilaterally by companies. They can relate to their own 
operations as, for example, with Shells Revised Statement of General Business Principles, or 
be applied specifically to their suppliers as in the case of Levi Strausss Business Partner Terms 
of Engagement. 
2. Trade association codes 
These are adopted by a group of firms in a particular industry. Like company codes, they tend 
to be a unilateral measure adopted by the firms. They may be adopted by associations of firms 
based in developed countries, as in the case of British Toy and Hobby Association code, or by 
developing country firms, such as the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA) code and the Kenya Flower Council code. 
3. Multi-stakeholder codes 
These are adopted as a result of negotiations between several stakeholders, including firms or 
their industry representatives, NGOs and/or trade unions. Governments may also be involved 
in the development of such codes. The UKs Ethical Trade Initiative Base Code is an example of 
such a multi-stakeholder approach. 
4. Model codes 
These are designed to provide a benchmark of what a particular organization regards as good 
practice in terms of codes of conduct. They are not generally applied in practice, but intended as 
a model which companies or trade associations could follow. These have been proposed, both 
by trade unions as, for example, the ICFTUs Basic Code of Conduct covering Labour Practices, 
and by NGOs like Amnesty International. 
5. Inter-governmental codes 
These are negotiated at an international level and are agreed to by national governments. They 
date back to the 1970s when both the OECDs Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 
ILOs Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises were adopted. 
 
14 OECD distinguishes between four types of codes: company codes, business association codes, codes involving 
partnerships of stakeholders and those created by international organizations (OECD, 2000, Fig. 1). A similar 
classification has been used by Kolk et al. (1999). 
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(c) Scope 
The selection of which issues are covered (and which are avoided) is a key element of any code 
of conduct. Several surveys of individual company, sectoral and comprehensive codes provide 
summaries of the coverage of a sample of such codes. 
 
The most comprehensive type of code of conduct would refer to the core labour standards 
identified by the ILO. These are derived from the following ILO Conventions: 
 
 Freedom of Association (C87) 
 Right to Collective Bargaining (C98) 
 No Forced Labour (C29, C105) 
 Minimum Age (C138) 
 No Discrimination (C111) 
 Equal Remuneration (C110) 
 
In addition, such a code might refer to a number of other aspects of labour conditions, which 
have not been included within the core labour standards, such as provisions on health and 
safety, maximum hours of work, wages, and security of employment. 
 
Table 3 presents the results for the 148 codes of conduct in the OECD inventory. This shows that 
there is considerable variation in the issues covered; only three aspects are dealt with in more 
than half the codes surveyed. These are a rather general commitment to a reasonable working 
environment, an agreement to comply with local laws, and protection against discrimination or 
harassment. The ILO codes were mentioned in only one in 10 of the codes, and it is clear that 
most codes do not cover ILO core labour standards. 
 
Unfortunately the OECD data on the coverage of labour issues does not distinguish between the 
different types of codes. This is an important limitation since it is likely that codes drawn up by 
international organizations, or by social interest groups, will have a more comprehensive 
coverage of core labour standards than those of individual companies or business groups (Kolk 
et al., 1999:table 1a). 
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Table 3: The labour content of the codes 
 Percentage of codes mentioning attribute* 
Reasonable working environment 75.7 
Compliance with laws 65.5 
No discrimination or harassment 60.8 
Compensation 45.3 
No child labour 43.2 
Obligations on contractors/suppliers 41.2 
No forced labour 38.5 
Provision of training 32.4 
Working hours 31.8 
Freedom of association 29.7 
Specific mention of human rights 25.0 
Monitoring 24.3 
Right to information 13.5 
ILO codes mentioned 10.1 
Promotion 8.8 
Reasonable advance notice 3.4 
No excessive casual labour 3.4 
Flexible workplace relations 0.7 
* Calculated as: 100*[the number of codes mentioning attribute]÷[the number of codes citing labour] 
Source: OECD, 2000:table 4. 
1. Company codes 
Studies of company codes of conduct confirm that there is considerable variation in terms of the 
extent to which different labour standards are covered. A study of 18 UK companies found that, 
whereas all codes include a statement about health and safety, and more than half had 
provisions on non-discrimination, minimum wages, child labour and forced labour, only a 
minority referred to hours of work and freedom of association. The least common measure to be 
included was job security (only 3 companies). Collective bargaining rights were not addressed 
in any of the codes (Ferguson, 1999:table 2). This last omission is highly significant since it is 
regarded as a core labour standard. 
 
A study of 10 US company codes in the clothing and retail sector showed a somewhat similar 
pattern (Sajhau, 1997). The most commonly included measures were on forced labour, child 
labour, health and safety, and non-discrimination. Half of the companies included a reference to 
minimum wages and maximum hours of work, although, in some cases, these merely stated 
that they should be in accordance with local laws. Only one company mentioned freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, and in no case was there any provision for job security 
2. Multi-company codes 
Table 4 provides information on multi-firm codes, which have either been developed for 
particular industries, or which are intended to be more generally applicable. These have been 
grouped into four types as discussed above. It can be seen that the most comprehensive in 
terms of coverage tend to be the model codes and the muti-stakeholder codes. Most of these 
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included all the core labour standards and other issues such as provision of proper employment 
contracts. 
 
In contrast, codes organized by business associations have much less extensive coverage of both 
core labour standards and other issues. Although a majority mention child labour and forced 
labour, as well as health and safety, hours of work and minimum wages, none included 
freedom of association, collective bargaining and non-discrimination.  
 
This is very similar to the picture that emerged from individual company codes. It is clear, 
therefore, that where codes are introduced as a form of self-regulation, either by companies 
acting on their own, or when industry associations act collectively, they do not usually cover 
the entire range of core labour standards. In particular, they tend not to allow for freedom of 
association or collective bargaining. They are also selective in terms of the other rights that are 
incorporated so that, although health and safety is frequently mentioned, proper contracts 
giving workers job security is very rarely included.15 
(d) Coverage 
                                                          
A further question is: who do these codes cover? There are several levels on which a code can 
operate. First, it can apply only to the companys own operations and thus operates as a 
declaration of business principles. Some companies, such as the Sara Lee Corporation, have 
both a code of principles, which it applies to its operating units, and a separate set of guidelines 
used in selecting suppliers (Sajhau, 1997).  
 
In many cases the code of conduct is specifically designed to ensure that suppliers comply with 
certain standards. For example, over 40 per cent of the codes covering labour issues in the 
OECD survey placed obligations on suppliers (see table 3). This was particularly prevalent in 
the garment industry where 26 out of 32 company codes surveyed were addressed to suppliers 
and contractors (OECD, 2000:24). However, there is the question of how far along the supply 
chain these standards are met. In the clothing industry, multiple subcontracting relationships 
are common and it is not always clear whether the code only applies to immediate suppliers to 
the firm, or to sub-subcontractors as well.  
 
There is also the issue of whether the code applies only to enterprises, or whether it also 
includes homeworkers, who are not formally employed by the manufacturer or its suppliers. 
None of the UK company codes studied by Ferguson covered home-workers or small-scale 
farmers (Ferguson, 1999:4). The only code that has been specifically developed for 
homeworkers is the Australian Code of Practice for Homeworkers developed by the Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia. Home-Net has been active in initiating discussions 
of the implications of codes of conduct for homeworkers, and is now involved in the UKs 
Ethical Trade Initiative. 
 
15 These are similar to the reported findings of a preliminary analysis of approximately 215 codes of conduct carried 
out by the ILO. This found that while three-quarters of the codes mentioned health and safety, and two-thirds 
addressed discrimination, only 15 per cent contained references to freedom of association and/or collective 
bargaining (ILO, 1998:1213). 
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 Table 4: Coverage of labour issues in multi-firm codes 
Initiative Health 
and safety 
No forced 
labour 
Hours 
of work 
Minimum 
age 
Wages 
(*living) 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
No 
discrimination 
Equal 
remuneration 
Proper 
employment 
contracts 
Inter-
governmental 
          
ILO           
OECD GMNE           
EU: CoC           
Model codes           
Amnesty     
  
   
          
*      
ICFTU CLP     *      
ICCR    *      
LBTL: WF     *      
CLPAIS     *      
HKCSPT        
Multi-stakeholder 
ETI     *      
SA8000     *      
Nicaragua   norm        
FTCG: Dutch     *      
WHAIP           
EURATEX/ETUC     *      
FIFA CLP     *      
Business 
Association 
          
BGMEA         
          
     
     
  
PAECLSBI  
ICTI   (law)   
BTHA   (60)   
Source: Pearson and Seyfang, forthcoming:table 2. 
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(e) Substance 
l i  
Although the range of issues that are addressed by different codes gives a very broad picture of 
their coverage, a simple checklist approach does not provide a full picture of the extent to which 
a code achieves an improvement in labour conditions. Thus, for instance, codes may specify a 
maximum number of hours per week, but this can be as high as 60 hours in many cases. 
Similarly, in some cases, the code only requires the observance of local requirements, for 
example, in terms of minimum wages or the use of child labour. It could be argued that a code 
of conduct that requires that a supplier or subsidiary operate within the law is not a very 
stringent one. 
(f) Imp ementat on
For a code of conduct to be meaningful, it must have clear methods of implementation and 
means to ensure that it is being complied with. The adoption of a code involves a statement of 
principles concerning business behaviour, which is not necessarily the same as application of 
those principles in the firms operations. The International Organization of Employers, for 
example, estimates that 80 per cent of codes are really statements about general business ethics, 
which have no implementation methods (quoted in ILO, 1998:7).  
 
In practice, implementation can only be guaranteed where there is an element of independent 
monitoring of codes of conduct. This has often proved to be a contentious issue because firms 
are reluctant to accept such arrangements. Even where there is a commitment in principle to 
independent monitoring, different stakeholders may differ over what they consider 
independent in this context. 
 
Of the 246 codes included in the OECD inventory, only just over 10 per cent included 
provisions for independent (external) monitoring, and only four out of over 100 company codes 
had such provisions (OECD, 2000:table 6). A survey of 132 codes by Kolk et al. (1999:168) came 
to very similar conclusions. In 41 per cent of cases there was no specific mention of monitoring, 
and in a further 44 per cent the firms themselves monitored compliance. Less than 10 per cent of 
company codes and 5 per cent of those set up by business groups had some form of external 
monitoring (Kolk et al., 1999:table 4b). In the United Kingdom, Fergusons (1999) study of 
company codes found that none of them made a clear commitment to systematic monitoring 
and independent verification. This is despite the fact that model codes often emphasize the 
importance of such systems. 
 
There are some exceptions to this general rule. The Gap in El Salvador has set up an 
independent monitoring working group in co-operation with the Interfaith Centre on Corporate 
Responsibility, Business for Social Responsibility and the National Labour Committee (Sajhau, 
1997:box 3). Involvement of other groups in monitoring is more common in the case of sector 
wide codes than individual company codes and, not surprisingly, is particularly evident in the 
case of codes that have been initiated by NGOs (Seyfang, 1999:table 8). 
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However the general conclusion that can be drawn is that, in most cases, stakeholder 
involvement in implementation is minimal. This is paradoxical since the discourse of corporate 
responsibility is replete with references to stakeholders and the need to take account of more 
than narrowly defined financial returns. It is in this area that the contrast between rhetoric and 
reality is particularly jarring. In the absence of independent monitoring and verification, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether company codes are applied extensively in practice or remain mere 
expressions of good intentions.16 
 
There is also the further question of the sanctions imposed when a code is not adhered to. In 
many cases no clear sanctions are defined. Around 60 per cent of the company and business 
association codes in the OECD inventory do not specify any penalties for non-compliance 
(OECD, 2000:table 6). When a supplier code is applied, it may specify that failure to comply will 
result in a contractor being dropped, although this is not always the case. It can also be argued 
that such an approach is not necessarily desirable since those who ultimately suffer from such 
sanctions are the workers themselves, ending up without a job. Therefore, in addition to the 
need for monitoring, it is also desirable that there be clear guidelines on how to deal with 
compliance failure. 
6. An Evaluation of Corporate Codes of Conduct 
There is no doubt that the growing emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the 
increased adoption of corporate codes of conduct in the 1990s represent a significant new 
development. However, the question of what they really represent remains to be answered. Are 
codes of conduct part of a public relations exercise on the part of corporations keen to deflect 
criticism of their activities, or do they reflect a new form of stakeholder control over business 
that is more appropriate in a globalized economy? Are codes a realistic alternative to the 
traditional mechanisms of state regulation and trade union bargaining, or do they need to 
operate in conjunction with them? 
(a) Lim tat ons i i
                                                          
As the previous sections have suggested, there are a number of limitations to codes of conduct 
as an instrument for promoting improved standards in developing countries. Some of these are 
practical limitations, which arise from the way in which codes have (or have not) been 
implemented up to now. Others are inherent to the nature of corporate codes and, therefore, go 
beyond just problems related to the way in which codes have been applied in the past.  
 
Despite the considerable publicity surrounding codes of conduct, the extent to which they have 
been adopted so far is relatively limited. Many company codes are little more than general 
statements of business ethics with no indication of the way in which they are to be 
implemented. Model codes are, by their very nature, only intended as an example of best 
practice on which individual firms or sectors can base their own codes. Many of the codes that 
 
16 Even where third party monitoring does occur, there are questions concerning the rigour of such monitoring, as the 
discussion in section 4 indicates. 
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have been drawn up by NGOs or by other collective organizations have so far been adopted by 
relatively few, if any, firms. Indeed in some cases the codes are still under negotiation and 
remain in draft form. For instance the Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry 
Including Sportswear, the Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code and the Dutch Fair Trade 
Charter for Garments are still under negotiation. The International Federation of Football 
Associations Code of Labour Practices has not yet been adopted by any firms, and relatively 
few have so far been accredited under SA8000 (Seyfang, 1999:table B). Codes tend to be taken 
up by industry leaders, but they are not necessarily adopted by the majority of firms. However, 
this last factor is partly a reflection of the recent increase in the number of firms adopting codes.  
 
Other limitations are the scope and extent of most corporate codes, in terms of issues addressed 
and workers covered. As was noted above, many codes do not even cover the ILO core labour 
standards, particularly those on freedom of association and collective bargaining, let alone go 
beyond these core standards to include other aspects of workers rights, such as security of 
employment. In terms of coverage, although codes usually cover immediate suppliers to the 
firm adopting the code, they do not always link further along the supply chain. Furthermore, 
there are whole groups of workers, often the most marginal, who do not come under the code. 
This is often the case for homeworkers, who are not directly employed by suppliers. In 
agriculture too, some of the most marginal and vulnerable groups are not always covered by a 
code of conduct . 
 
The other major limitation of existing codes of conduct is the lack of independent monitoring to 
ensure that they are not just general statements of business principles, but actually regulations 
that get applied to the firms operations and those of its suppliers. The reluctance of many firms 
to include independent monitoring as an integral part of their code of conduct gives rise to 
some suspicion that they may be used as a public relations exercise rather than a genuine 
attempt at improving conditions and performance. However, some leading firms have accepted 
such monitoring, and the growth of auditing and accreditation bodies indicates some 
improvement in this area.17 
 
The more deep-seated structural limitations of codes of conduct relate to the drivers identified 
earlier as giving rise to the growth of such codes in the 1990s. First of all, they tend to be 
concentrated in consumer good sectors where brand names and corporate image are very 
important. This helps explain why the large-scale retail sector, garments and footwear, toys and 
some food products have been the sectors where codes covering social issues have most 
commonly been found. They also tend to be sectors in which the cost of individual purchases is 
relatively low, and where production costs often make up a relatively small part of the final 
product price. Sectors that produce durable consumer goods, where the cost of a single item is 
relatively high, such as cars, have been much less prominent in the discussion of corporate 
codes of conduct. 
                                                           
17 There are questions concerning the nature of some of the bodies that have taken up social auditing, in terms of their 
expertise in this area, and there is a suspicion in some quarters that auditing firms and consultancy companies have 
entered this area in order just to diversify their portfolio of activities. 
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Not only are codes limited to particular sectors, they are also mainly applied to firms which are 
engaged in exporting. Since pressure for the adoption of codes of conduct has come primarily 
from the North, it is firms selling in Northern markets that need to meet these requirements. 
Despite globalization, many producers in the South are not linked to the global market directly 
or indirectly and, therefore, do not have to worry about codes of conduct. There is a possibility, 
therefore, that when codes are adopted, they become oases of best practice, leaving most 
producers unaffected. 
 
Finally, there is a tendency for codes to focus on particular issues regarded as highly damaging 
for companies to be associated with. Issues that have a high profile in developed countries are 
likely to figure prominently in most codes. Child labour is a case in point, highlighted because 
of the emotive reaction of those in the North to the idea of children working in factories. This 
does not necessarily coincide with what are perceived as key issues by other stakeholders, 
particularly those in the South. It is inherent, therefore, to the way in which codes of conduct 
have developed that they tend to be patchy in scope and not at all comprehensive. 
(b) Benefits 
Notwithstanding the limitations of codes, they can and have generated positive benefits for 
stakeholders. The Gap agreed to continue to source from the Mandarin factory in El Salvador, 
following improvements in working conditions. Workers were reinstated (including members 
of the union executive) and allowed to re-establish the union. A similar situation occurred in the 
Kimi garment factory in Hondurassacked workers were also reinstated and allowed to 
organize a union (Jeffcott and Yanz, 2000). Concrete improvements have also been reported in 
Nikes factories in Viet Nam, including the reduction of hazardous chemicals and 
improvements in ventilation and safety conditions (Grayson, 1999:20) 
 
These examples illustrate the fact that codes of conduct do provide a point of leverage on 
corporate behaviour. First, if companies adopt codes that are very limited in scope and 
coverage, the company can be criticized by other stakeholders. Model codes perform a useful 
role in this context since they can be used to show how far a companys practice falls short of 
recommended standards or industry best practice.  
 
Second, if companies sign up to codes that are meaningful, they are open to criticism if they fail 
to implement the code. Although, in the absence of independent monitoring, it is difficult 
sometimes to know whether a company is abiding by the terms of its own code, instant 
international communications and contact between different stakeholders, particularly NGOs 
and trade unions, can help reveal cases of violation. Management then runs the risk of being 
accused of hypocrisy if these failures are publicized. 
 
A third potential benefit from the emphasis on codes of conduct is the growing awareness that 
consumption is not divorced from production, not only an activity of exchange in the 
marketplace. Codes of conduct, therefore, whether covering social or environmental aspects, go 
beyond what is produced to look at how it is produced. This could have long-term implications 
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for the way economic activity is viewed. In conventional economic thinking, consumer concerns 
are limited to the quality of the product and its price. This means that the individual consumers 
priorities are directly at odds with those of the social actor. However, once wider issues of 
production are recognized, then the potential for further mobilization around the implications 
of consumer choices is opened up.  
 
Finally, an important advance associated with codes of conduct is the acceptance by firms of 
responsibility for the activities of their suppliers as well as their own subsidiaries. This concept 
of extended responsibility makes it more difficult for firms to externalize costs, whether social 
or environmental, and then claim that they themselves are behaving ethically or in an 
environmentally friendly way. Just as lifecycle analysis of the environmental impacts of 
products has widened the concept of corporate responsibility in relation to environmental 
issues, the development of codes covering social issues, which apply to suppliers, has widened 
the concept of social responsibility.  
(c) Dangers 
There are nevertheless several dangers associated with the growth of codes of conduct. The first 
is that they may come to be seen as something more than they really are. In some cases they can 
simply be a means to deflect public criticism, without really changing what is happening on the 
ground. In other words, there is a distinct possibility of bad faith in the development of codes 
of conduct. It is important, therefore, that codes not be seen simply as a set of guidelines to be 
established and complied with for the rest of time. Rather they should be thought of as a 
process which facilitates stakeholder engagement, and which provides a platform for further 
advances in terms of improving the impact of big business on social and environmental 
conditions. 
 
Even when a code of conduct is adopted in good faith, its effects may prove to be counter-
productive. Codes tend to involve prohibitions, but this may not always be the best way of 
improving conditions. It has been argued that an outright ban on the use of child labour can 
bring about a deterioration in the livelihoods of the most vulnerable families, who depend on 
the additional income that children bring in. It is also possible that, where children are banned 
from working in export industries, they will end up being employed in even worse conditions 
in enterprises that only supply the domestic market. This is reported to have occurred in 
Bangladesh after child workers were dismissed from the garment industry in the mid-1990s 
(DFID, 2000). 
 
Another situation in which the requirements of codes of conduct may worsen the situation of 
the least well placed is the case of firms that find it impossible to ensure that a large number of 
small suppliers all abide by the terms of its code of conduct. In this case, there may be pressure 
to centralize suppliers and dispense with the smaller suppliers that are impossible to monitor. 
Thus, a shrinking of the supplier base may leave the most disadvantaged without access to the 
export market. 
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Another concern is that the development of codes of conduct will tend to undermine the 
position of traditional trade union organizations. Of course, in some cases codes of conduct can 
be used where trade unions are not recognized. If trade union organization is impossible, then it 
is hard to argue that codes of conduct are displacing trade unions. In general, the appropriate 
response would be to ensure that codes maximize the space for trade unions to act, rather than 
bypassing them or trying to replace them. 
 
A further fear is that codes of conduct will replace government regulation and remove the 
pressure for government control of corporations. It is true that, as was pointed out earlier in the 
paper, codes of conduct have grown rapidly in the aftermath of the period of extensive 
liberalization. However, the growth of codes as such has not led to the reduced role of the state, 
although the reverse may be partially true. Corporate codes often explicitly mention the need to 
observe local standards as an element in their code, whether in terms of hours of work, wage 
levels or environmental standards. It would be a mistake to see codes of conduct as a substitute 
for government regulation, and any realistic evaluation of codes must take this point into 
account. 
 
The limitations and the dangers of codes of conduct that have been identified above are 
undoubtedly real. It is important, therefore, to develop strategies to ensure that codes are 
complementary to government legislation and provide space for workers to organize. They are 
most likely to do so when they are multi-stakeholder codes rather than unilaterally developed 
by companies or trade associations. Codes of conduct should be seen as an area of political 
contestation, rather than as a solution to the problems created by the globalization of economic 
activity. 
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